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RECENT DECISIONS

LANDLORD AND TENANT - ANTICIPATORY OR PARTIAL BREACH BY
LESSEE - Plaintiff was lessor and defendant was lessee under a ninety-nine
year lease. After thirty-one years had expired under the lease, defendant gave
notice of his intention to quit at the end of the current quarter. Plaintiff informed defendant that he would not accept a surrender, but before the end of
the quarter defendant abandoned the premises. When defendant refused to pay
rent·for the next quarter as it became due, plaintiff sued for the difference between the rent reserved for a thirty-year period and the fair rental value for
such a period. Held, the repudiation constituted a total breach of the lease, and
plaintiff could recover the difference between the rent reserved for a ten-year
period and the reasonable rental value for that time.1 Hawkimon v. Johnston,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 724.
Repudiation of a lease would not seem to present a proper case for allowing

1 The decision does not indicate whether the plaintiff will be able to bring another
suit after the ten-year period is over or whether the recovery in this suit bars all future
actions on the lease. If the case is a proper one for either the doctrine of anticipatory
breach or the doctrine of future damages for a partial breach, the court would not seem
justified in limiting recovery to damages to be suffered in the next ten years. Uncertainty of amount is not sufficient reason for denying recovery for breach of contract.
See Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K. B. 786.
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recovery for anticipatory breach of contract,2 for such recovery is usually allowed
only when the obligation to perform the repudiated promise is conditional upon
some precedent performance by the promisee.3 Since a lease is primarily a conveyance,4 the· lessor has completely performed by executing it, and the lessee's
obligation to pay rent is not dependent upon any future performance by the lessor. 5 In the instant case, the court avoided this obstacle by saying that the covenant to pay rent was dependent on the lessor's continuing covenants to assure
quiet enjoyment and defend title. If the premise be admitted, the court's decision is probably-sound, but there is no indication in the opinion that the lease
expressly made these covenants dependent, and in view of the generally accepted
rule that the covenants of a lease are independent, 6 the assumption of the court
does not seem warranted. However, the court did not have to decide the case on
the basis of anticipatory breach, since in addition to the repudiation there was an
actual default in the covenant to pay rent. Therefore the real question seems
to be whether the lessor's recovery should be measured only by the amount of
rent already due, or whether the rent to become due in the future should also be
included. The general rule is that damages to be suffered in the future may not
be recovered for a partial breach of a unilateral obligation to pay a liquidated sum
2 Recovery for anticipatory breach of a lease has most often been refused on the
grounds of an inherent difference between a covenant of a lease to pay rent and ordinary contract obligations, in that a covenant to pay rent creates no obligation present or
contingent until the date the rent falls due, because the enjoyment of the land is the
consideration for the rent, and since the lessee may never get the enjoyment he may
never have to pay the rent. Wood v. Partridge, II Mass. 488 (1814); Bordman v.
Osborn, z3 Pick. (40 Mass.) z95 (1839); In re Roth & Appel, (C. C. A. zd, 1910)
181 F. 667; Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust Co., 134 Me. 37z, 186 A. 885
(1936); In re McAllister-Mohler Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1930) 46 F. (zd) 91; People
ex rel .. Nelson v. West Town State Bank, 373 III. 106, z5 N. E. (zd) 509 (1940).
Rather than being a reason for denying suit for anticipatory breach, this would seem
to be a reason for allowing recovery, since the chief requirement for such a suit is that
the repudiated promise be conditional.
3 Hochster v. De La Tour, z EI. & Bl. 678, II8 Eng. Rep. 9zz (1853); Huffman v. Martin, zz6 Ky. 137, IO S. W. (zd) 636 (19z8); Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S.
1, zo S. Ct. 780 (1899).
4 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 16 (1910); Crouse v. Michell, 130
Mich. 347, 90 N. W. 3z (19oz); Sagamore Corp v. Willcutt, 1zo Conn. 315, 180
A. 464 (1935).
5 Recovery on the theory of anticipatory breach of a lease was denied on this line
of reasoning in Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460 (1886), and Sagamore Corp.
v. Willcutt, IZO Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935). Professor Williston suggests substantially the same approach, though he chooses to treat the lease as a bilateral contract
with independent covenants, which is probably more accurate because of the lessor's
covenants to repair, defend title, etc. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 13z9
(1937).
6 I TIFFANY; LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 51 (1910); Barry v. Frankini, z87
Mass. 196, 191 N. E. 651 (1934); Palmer v. Meriden Britannia Co., 188 Ill. 508,
59 N. E. z47 (1900).
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of money. 7 Since the covenant to pay rent is generally considered unilateral/'
and the amount of the rent is a liquidated sum, it would seem that future damages should not be allowed. But to be consistent with the principle that a lease
is a conveyance the courts have to hold that, when the lessee abandons the
premises and repudiates his obligation, the lessor cannot resume p<;>ssession without
accepting a surrender, thereby losing his rights against the lessee.9 But most
courts now give the lessor an election either to suffer the premises to lie idle
and sue for the rent as it falls due or to re-enter and hold the lessee for the difference between the rent reserved and what can be realized by reletting.10 In
many cases the second alternative is explained by saying that the lessor re-entered
and relet as agent of the lessee. 11 Viewed in this way the procedure would
not be inconsistent either with the principle that a lease is a conveyance or with
the conception of the covenant to pay rent as a unilateral obligation to pay a
liquidated sum of money. However, the explanation is at best a fiction, and the
modern tendency is away from it, the courts holding that the lessor's action
is really for breach of contract and the reletting is by way of mitigation of damages.12 Once this view is adopted it may no longer be said that the damages are
liquidated, and there can then be no objection to allowing recovery of future
damages. 13 If this approach to the problem be accepted, the result in the principal case is not without justification.14 Likewise the previously considered
7 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 2024 (1938); Flinn & Treacy v. Mowry,
131 Cal. 481, 63 P. 724 (1901). See comment in 31 M1cH. L. REv. 526 (1933),
for a criticism of this general rule.
8 See cases in note 4, supra.
9 See Deming v. Scoville, 220 Ala. 424, 125 So. 683 (1930); James v. Kibler's
Admr., 94 Va. 165, 26 S. E. 417 (1896); Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S. C. 251, 139
S. E. 614 (1927), allowing the lessor to recover damages for the whole term of the
lease when the lessee repudiates the lease and refuses to enter, but recognizing that the
lessor could recover only for the rent due if the tenant repudiated the lease and abandoned the premises after he had once entered possession, distinguishing on the ground
that the first is a breach of a contract to lease, while the second is a covenant to pay
rent.
10 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 190, p. 1333 (19xo); Rehkopf v.
Wirz, 31 Cal. App. 695, 161 P. 285 (1916).
11 The jurisdictions vary considerably as to the conditions under which the lessor
will be allowed to retain his rights against the original lessee after re-entering or
reletting. For illustrative cases see annotations 3 A. L. R. 1080 (1919); 52 A. L. R.
154 (1928); 61 A. L. R. 773 (1929); 110 A. L. R. 368 (1937).
12 Hays v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W. 563 (1903); Hyman v. Seiden,
(App. Div. 1918) 168 N. Y. S. 643.
13 Marathon Oil Co. v. Rone, (Tex. Civ. App. 1-935) 83 S. W. (2d) 1028;
Wilson v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 P. 941 (1928); Salvation Army
v. Daily Telegram of Long Beach, 125 Cal. App. 743, 14 P. (2d) 123 (1932);
Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley, 200 Wis. 412, 228 N. W. 515 (1930); Jones v.
McQuesten, 172 Wash. 480, 20 P. (2d) 838 (1933).
H In Grayson v. Mixon, 176 Ark. II23, 5 S. W. (2d) 312 (1928), and Wilson
v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 P. 941 (1928), recovery of the difference between all rent coming due in the future and the reasonable rental value for
the same period was allowed because the suit was to recover damages for breach of con-
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objection to allowing suit for anticipatory breach· would seem obviated, for in
holding that the lessor by reletting mitigates damages the courts are actually
treating the lease as a bilateral executory contract in which the promise to pay
rent is dependent on the promise of the lessor to allow the lessee to occupy the
premises for the term of the lease.15

tract and not to collect ren\ under the terms of the lease. But see Dickinson v. Univers~
Service Stations, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) IOO F. (2d) 753, and Smith v. Frank, 252
App. Div. 834, 299 N. Y. S. 125 (1937), holding that the lessor must wait until the
rent under the abandoned lease becomes due before he can sue, even though his action
is for breach of contract and not rent.
15 Damages for breach of a unilateral contract or of a bilateral contract with independent promises are assessed at the full value of the defendant's promise, while damages
for breach of a bilateral contract in which the promises are dependent are assessed
by subtracting the value of the unperformed part of the plaintiff's promise from the
value of defendant's promise. 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 1349 (1937).

